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ABSTRACT

The first of six sections in this guide to security for special collections in archives and libraries discusses the importance of security and the difficulty of preventing theft of archival materials. The second section, which focuses on planning, recommends an inservice training program for staff, a planned communications network between library staff and police or security personnel, and cooperation with book dealers and collectors to identify book "fences." The contents of the inservice program are outlined, and the impact of the security system on patrons, the determination of which collections need to be protected, and the security of the building itself are considered. Various types of security equipment are described in the third section, including locking systems, security alarms, surveillance equipment, and guards. The pros and cons of each type of system are considered. Fire and water hazards are addressed in the fourth section, and criteria for evaluating fire protection are suggested. The fifth section discusses the legal aspects of the problem and suggests five questions that the administrator may wish to present to an attorney. A brief concluding statement in the sixth section reiterates the fact that, although electronic and legal tools are becoming available to archivists, the best security and surveillance systems are the diligence of staff members and the administrator's resolve to prosecute all crimes against the archives. A written statement of reference area rules, and regulations and guidelines for marking rare books, manuscripts, and other special collections are appended. (11 references) (BBM)

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SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR ARCHIVES: RARE BOOK, MANUSCRIPT AND OTHER SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

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INTRODUCTION

"Security" exists in situations where harm and loss can be controlled within certain acceptable minimums and, where those involved, perceive the situations to be controlled (3:25). As with most things in life, there are no perfect security systems. No matter how good a security system seems, it usually can be penetrated.

A case in point involved a major state library which thought it had a good security system. At the time of the theft, public access to the reference room was through one entrance. An archivist provided constant surveillance during operating hours. There were stack attendants assigned to retrieve all requested items; thus, enabling the archivist uninterrupted surveillance. All patrons had to present identification and complete a registration form; plus, they had to sign in each day (9:1).

Despite these measures, one man stole in excess of one hundred documents valued at more than twenty thousand dollars. Even though the stolen letters were written by such people as Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, the documents were stolen primarily for their postmarks rather than for their signatures or historical content. The major reason for archival theft remains monetary gain (5:480).

Although the thief was eventually apprehended and convicted, the case highlights a number of critical points. The obvious point is even good systems can be penetrated. Second, valuable documents can be taken for reasons other than their historical content. Third, it is important to maintain accurate records of photocopying orders and call slips as a means of proving ownership. Fourth, archivists must stress to the courts the severity of theft of our historical records. And fifth, collectors and dealers are critical in the apprehension process (9:1).

PLANNING

Because of the complexity of the problem and the significant cost of improvements, many curators, archivists, and librarians have given little attention to security. The ever increasing problem of theft will not go away, no matter how long it is ignored. It is important, therefore , to develop an in-service training program for staff, develop a planned communications network between your staff and police or security personnel, and work cooperatively with book dealers and collectors to identify book "fences" (4:28).

1. The Staff:

The most important part of a good archival security program is personnel. Since a good security program will demand a significant amount of staff time, it is important for the director to involve the staff in the planning stage and to impress upon them the importance of security. An atmosphere of trust and mutual concern for the collections is probably the best insurance against theft.

The staff should be chosen carefully, and background checks should be done at the time of hiring (8:30). Bonding of key staff should be considered. Staff should know their responsibility regarding security and their legal rights in handling possible problems. The staff also should be subject to the same security procedures as the patrons (eg. maintaining records of use of materials, checking belongings upon entering and leaving the secure area, and keeping unnecessary personal items out of the work areas).

To emphasize the importance of security, a senior staff member should be named Security Officer, with the responsibility and authority to carry out the security program. The identity of the security officer should be widely known.

First priority for the security officer should be to plan a program. This program should include surveying the collections and their physical layout, seeking the advice and assistance of appropriate personnel (life safety officers, law enforcement personnel, and insurance agencies) (1:90). The next priority should be to develop a continuing in-service training program. Even though training requirements vary widely from institution to institution, following is a outline for developing a training program (3:80-82):

I. Establish objectives

   A. Orientation training and security/protection measures for staff members
   B. On-going awareness of security needs
      1. Dealing with disruptive situations
      2. Preventing security breaches

II. Determine "time-lines" for in-service sessions

   A. Incorporate security into orientation for new employees
   B. Annual review and update for all employees

III. Contents of in-service training program for new employees

A. Written security policies
   1. Explanation of security policies and procedures (handbooks, manuals, plot plans, floor layouts, etc.)
   2. Identification of security policies of campus, city and county

B. Tour of physical facilities (interior and exterior)
   1. Emergency exits
   2. Parking facilities
   3. Lighting system
   4. Fire alarms
   5. Emergency telephones
   6. Entrances and exits
   7. Restroom security
   8. Special collections requiring additional security
   9. Secluded areas

C. Demonstration of equipment, devices, and protection measurements
   1. Door locks
   2. Alarm signals
   3. Intercom systems
   4. Fire extinguishers
   5. Electronic security/detection systems
   6. First aid kits
   7. Automatic signaling devices
   8. Pagers, walkie-talkies
   9. Window locks
   10. Money handling
   11. Central control consoles
   12. Closed circuit TV

D. Major security problems and procedures for handling:
   1. Theft
   2. Mutilation of materials
   3. Nonreturn of materials
   4. Arson
   5. Disruptive patrons
   6. Medical emergencies
   7. Power outages
   8. Bomb threats
   9. Fires, floods, storms

E. Staff's responsibilities
   1. To each other
   2. To the patron
   3. To the collection

F. Auxiliary personnel
   1. Security guards
   2. City or campus police
   3. Fire department
   4. Paramedics
   5. Mental health and social workers
   6. Legal advisors

IV. Follow-up security measures

   A. Continuous reporting of security problems to director
   B. Periodic reevaluation of security policies and procedures (with staff participation)
   C. Posting and dissemination of written policies and procedures
   D. Ongoing study of impact security measures on public relations

2. The Patron:

The second consideration in planning a security system is its impact on patrons. An important raison d'etre of the archivist is to encourage the use of collections. Obtrusive security systems act only as deterrents to access to archival and manuscript collections. Weighing free access against restriction is often a delicate balance. If handled properly, the archival staff can enlist their patrons in promoting better security. This could be performed by giving each patron an orientation to the collections and to the security procedures before using the collections, providing a secure area for patron's personal effects, maintaining adequate check-out records indefinitely, and having patrons read and sign a statement of rules and regulations (A sample "Statement of Rules and Regulations is at Appendix 1) (9:7).

3. The Collections:

Another consideration is what actually needs protection. Archivists must look at their collection from the perspective of the thief. All items of market value should be identified and no collection should be overlooked. Adequate accession records should be kept, and cataloging and listings in finding aids should be as detailed as possible. Unprocessed materials should not be made available to researchers without careful checking.

Some materials may receive consideration for marking following the RBMS Guidelines for Marking (Specific Guidelines for Marking Rare Books, Manuscripts and Other Special Collections"is at Appendix 2) (1:91-93). Marking offers one of the best means of protecting individual items from theft. Yet no matter how conscientious the archivist, it is impossible to mark every item. Should the item be

discovered missing, it should be reported to the SAA Register of Lost or Stolen Archival Materials. This register is distributed periodically to dealers and curators and provides current information on what is known to be missing. Forms for he registration of missing items are available from the SAA, Box 8198, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Chicago, Illinois 60680. Thefts should also be reported to law enforcement agencies and to Bookline Alert: Missing Books and Manuscripts (BAMBAM), 121 East 78th Street, New York, New York 10027, telephone (212) 737-2715. BAMBAM is a national program for theft control endorsed by the Rare Books and Manuscripts Section of ACRL. An additional possibility is an advertisement in the Stolen Books column of AB Bookman's Weekly (PO Box AB, Clifton, New Jersey, 07015). Listings in these publications will help prevent unknowing transfer of stolen materials and to facilitate their return.

In addition to accession records, circulation records, and marking, another means of proving ownership is special insurance policies. There remains some question as to the value of insurance because certain manuscripts and items are irreplaceable. Many archivists and librarians think insurance provides no valid function and that money spent on insurance could be spent on improving other area of security. Also, the high cost of insuring thousands of linear feet of rare items may prove prohibitive.

For those who decide in favor of insuring small quantities of their collections (marketable items), a rule of thumb might be to insure those items you have stamped or marked. You should consult an outside appraiser to determine the market value of each item. Insured items should be reappraised every five years.

Photocopying and microfilming are other means of protecting your collections. And more valuable items may be segregated from the collection to higher security areas and made available only under special circumstances (1:91-93).

4. The Building

The final major consideration for archival security is the security of the building itself. Most thefts of archival and manuscript materials occur during normal operating hours. The motive of the manuscript thief is similar to that of the shoplifter, one who hides items on his person and nonchalantly walks out the front door. Although break-ins rarely occur at archives and manuscript repositories, the archivist is not absolved from providing building security.

After consulting with local law enforcement authorities, staff, and insurance agencies, the security officer should perform an audit of the collections' perimeter defenses. Following are some key concerns which should be addressed by the audit (2:45-46):

A. Principal exits: Are present exits necessary? Is there a security system installed? Is the security system full-circulating or by-pass? Do you employ guards? What is the extent of searches (full, random, casual, or just purses, bags, briefcases, etc.)? Is the exit flow restricted? What is the patron behavior? What types of doors and locks are installed?

B. Emergency exits: Is there visual control? Is there an alarm system? Is there an electronic recording of exits? What are the characteristics of the doors and locks?

C. Employee exits: Is there visual control of these exits? Are they staffed/locked? What type of doors and locks are installed?

D. Loading docks: Same concerns as "c" above.

E. Windows: Are they locked? Are they secured with screens? Is there an alarm system? What is the ease of breakage? How close are they to ground level?

F. Utility tunnels: Are they locked? Are they used as exits?

G. Ceiling: What type? Is there access to the security system? Is there a crawl space?

H. After hours concealment: What is the ease of concealment? Is the building camouflaged by trees, or by other buildings/structures?

I. Special collections: Are they locked? Is there an alarm system? What are the characteristics of the doors and locks? What is the ease of concealment? What is the ease of exit from the special collections area?

J. Exhibition cases: Are they secure? Is there an alarm system?

K. After hours book return: What is the capacity? What is the ease of removal? What is the ease of vandalism and arson?

L. Smoke/fire detectors: Is there an adequate number? Are they reachable? Is there evidence of damage, inoperability, or poor maintenance? What is the ease of false alarm?

M. Computer room: Is it locked? What is the availability of keys? Are files backed-up and kept off site? Are there fire detectors? Is there automatic fire extinguishing? Do you use passwording and other access controls? Do you keep audit trails for record changes?

SECURITY EQUIPMENT

As mentioned earlier, break-ins are not a common occurrence at archival repositories, yet, they do happen. Archivists, therefore, must be certain their institutions are secured both during normal operating hours and after closing. The collections' security can be significantly enhanced by using locking systems, security alarms, surveillance equipment, and guards or a combination of security systems.

1. Locking Systems

More than 60% of recorded illegal entries occur through doors (9:10). Relatively few burglars have the skill to jimmy or pick a lock. Most use brute force to break open a door. Thus, it behooves archivists to be aware of the quality of not only locks, but also their doors and door frames.

No door or lock is impenetrable, and together, they are only as strong as their weakest point. Poorly fitted doors in thin frames will not secure even the best of locks.

Following are examples of types of locks from the weakest to the most secure:

A. Key-in-the-knob: This device is secured with a beveled latch that extends into the door jamb. Most of these doors can be opened with a piece of plastic (eg. credit card). These locks can be purchased with a trigger bolt which will prevent entry by a credit card. Because of these weaknesses, key-in-the-door locks are not recommended for any door in the archives.

B. Mortise: The mortise lock is a more secure variety. These locks have two devices that lock into the door jamb---a dead bolt and a convenience latch. With its non-beveled bolt extending one half inch or more

into the door jamb, the mortise lock provides adequate protection against jimmying. The primary weakness of the mortise lock is that people tend to forget to set the deadbolt after they close the door.

C. Another variety is the vertical bolt auxiliary lock. This type of lock is intended for use as a supplement to the mortise lock in high security areas. Lock experts consider the vertical bolt lock to be the best protection against jimmying. The best variety features a key cylinder on the inside of the lock instead of a thumb turn. This prevents the burglar from breaking a door panel and reaching inside the door to release the thumb latch. Like the mortise and the key-in-the-knob, the vertical bolt lock is no match for the professional burglar.

Repositories should have a vault for storing precious items that have marketable value. If you cannot afford a vault, an improvised closet could suffice. It should be fitted with a solid-core door with fixed pin hinges, and a mortise lock supplemented with a vertical bolt lock.

2. Security Alarms

Security alarms are, perhaps the most expensive and complex means of archival security. Their function could be to delay access to the premises, detect intrusion by means of an alarm, frighten away the intruder, and apprehend the intruder, or, a combination of these. All protective equipment consists of three elements: the detection device, the communicating element and the response procedure (9:12).

Exterior equipment is designed to detect intrusion through doors, windows, skylights, and other openings to the building. Most devices consist of thin wiring or foil tape that will signal the breakage of glass or door panels. Most devices are electromechanical in nature and transmit an electrical impulse which signals an alarm if the current is interrupted.

Other forms of exterior detection devices are the balanced magnetic switch and the contact switch. A balanced magnetic switch juxtaposes two magnetic fields against each other, keeping the alarm switch closed. If the magnetic field is disturbed, an alarm will be signaled. The contact switch consists of current running through two contacts, usually one on the frame and the other mounted on the hinge side of the door. If the contact is broken, an alarm will sound.

Interior detection devices are more numerous and varied in nature. An ultrasonic device emits soundwaves which are picked up by a receiver. If the waves are interrupted, an alarm will be activated. A microwave device establishes an electromagnetic field which, when disturbed engages an alarm. Photoelectric systems operate by transmitting infrared or ultraviolet beams to a receiver and are activated by disturbance of the beams of light. Pressure sensitive switches can be installed under mats or carpet and are triggered by the weight of an intruder. Vibration detectors pick up vibrations such as breaking doors, walls, windows, etc.

In addition to selecting an alarm(s), the archivist must determine the type of alarm signal to employ. The least expensive are the loud, noisy, local alarms. All these are good for are unnerving the intruder and possibly getting the attention of a passerby who may be too apathetic to respond to the alarm. Silent alarms usually register a signal with a central control monitor connected to the local police station or alarm company.

3. Surveillance Equipment

Closed circuit television (CCTV) is an effective means of deterring the impulsive theft and reducing mutilation which occurs when an item has parts removed from it or is altered so as to make it imperfect (11:12). Most institutions which have CCTV most often use the system after a staff member has begun to suspect a patron of theft. Few archival institutions can afford to pay someone to monitor the screens constantly. While some institutions have installed dummy cameras, which may deter the amateur, they are quite obvious to the professional thief.

4. GUARDS

Those that can guard, should (3:29). There are many reasons to use guards, some of which are: a uniformed guard provides a visible focus of authority; staff members know instantly to whom to refer emergencies; guards are knowledgeable of the rules and regulations of the archives; and the authority of a guard is strengthened by repeated exercise of that authority.

However, guards should not be hired until there orders have been determined. These orders could include: all rules, regulations, and operating instructions that have been developed for the archives; the duty hours; a routine for breaks, periodic inspections, and lock and alarm checks, etc.; the physical boundaries of the guarded site; phone numbers and individuals to contact in various types of emergencies; uniform and/or weapon; and any special instructions.

There are three prevalent types of guards from which to choose: a police officer, an in-house guard or a contract guard. Hiring a police officer should not be the administrator's first choice. Some of the negative arguments include: low level of alertness from working another fulltime job; a high level of training enables the police officer to command a higher rate of pay; and the police officer, who has been trained to react to emergencies, may find the work dull and boring.

There are also reasons to not consider hiring a contract guard. The four most common problems with employing contract guards are: inadequate training, poor supervision, low morale, and high turnover.

In-house guards appear to be the best suited. The administrator can better control the type of person hired and their level of training, and dictate the performance standards.

FIRE AND WATER HAZARDS

Often overlooked are fire suppression and flood control. As part of the evaluation process for fire prevention and suppression systems, the archivist should consult the excellent manuals published by the National Fire Protection Association.

Following are some important considerations when evaluating fire protection (9:14-15):

A. If the location of the archives building is located near an industrial complex, the roof should have a fire-resistant covering.

B. The construction and arrangement of he interior should be such that potential fires are isolated in as small an area as possible.

C. The storage of record cartons should be parallel to the aisle so that it does not contribute to the spread of the fire.

D. How close is the local fire department and how quickly do they respond?

E. What kind of fire suppression equipment is necessary for adequate protection? Does the fire detection system sound an alarm in the repository, summon the local fire department, indicate the location of the fire, shut down the building ventilation system, and

recall the elevators? Suppression systems can include water sprinkler systems and various types of fire extinguishers.

F. A final important consideration is staff training. All employees should have practical experience with the operation of fire extinguishers and fire alarm systems.

Water can cause severe damage to records of all kinds. In addition to floods, the archivist must be concerned with frozen or broken water pipes and sprinkler systems. If water damage does occur, archivists should follow the instructions listed Peter Waters' manual, Procedures for the Salvage of Water Damaged Library Materials (10:2-4).

A. Consult book and paper conservators.

B. Turn off heat and create free circulation of air.

C. Maintain a constant flow of air to reduce the threat of mold.

D. Brief workers carefully before salvage operation begin, paying particular attention to recognizing materials with water soluble components, leather and vellum bindings, materials printed on coated paper stock and photographic materials.

E. Do not attempt to restore items on site.

F. Clean items with cold, running water. use sponges in a dabbing motion.

G. Do not attempt to open a wet book.

H. Do not attempt to remove all mud by sponging. Mud is more easily removed when dry.

I. Do not remove covers from books, as they will provide support when drying.

J. Do not press books when they are water-soaked.

K. Do not write on wet paper or artifacts.

L. Use clean, white blotter paper, white paper towels, or unprinted newspaper for interleaving.

M. Do not pack newly dried materials in boxes and leave unattended for more than a few days.

N. Do not use bleaches, detergents, water-soluble fungicides, wire staples, paper or bulldog clips, adhesive tape, or adhesives of any kind.

LEGAL ASPECTS

Concurrent with the advent of electronic security has been the enactment of tough laws regarding library theft. Some of the most progressive legislation comes from the states of Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin where laws finally recognize the theft and mutilation of library materials as a criminal act (7:78). Even with electronic security systems and tougher laws there is still evidence that libraries lack a strong commitment to preventing theft. Procedures libraries follow in dealing with offenders show a continuing tolerance for crime. Theft will remain a threat to collections until libraries are willing to take punitive action against thieves (6:75). Not only should library security measures concentrate on apprehending criminals, but they should also be prepared to prosecute.

One of the first things an administrator should do is determine the nature and extent of the legal counsel provided by his governing institution. Once an attorney has been identified, the attorney should review the operations and policies of the library/archive. Questions the administrator may wish to present the attorney are (3:106):

1. What is the status of the state's sovereign immunity or charitable immunity doctrine in regard to libraries? Can either of these doctrines be relied upon to bar a lawsuit against the library or its employees?

2. Does the state have a security statute which will protect an employee from civil and/or criminal liability if the employee believes he is acting to prevent a theft? Can policies be developed to help guide the employees' response to this type of situation?

3. Is insurance coverage required? How does this affect the library's potential liability for injuries to patrons?

4. Are current search/surveillance techniques legal? Are they necessary? Can a less obtrusive policy be implemented?

5. Are signs warning of electronic surveillance, exit searches, etc., necessary? What constitutes a legal sign?

CONCLUSION

Archivists are finally getting the electronic eyes, ears, and sensors and the legal teeth to fight crime. But, to reiterate, the best security and surveillance systems are only as good as their weakest link. In essence, the best security remains the diligence of staff members and the administrator's resolve to prosecute all crimes against the archives.

APPENDIX I

REFERENCE AREA RULES AND REGULATIONS

The following rules and regulations are not intended to place a burden on the researcher. We are merely attempting to protect and preserve the materials the researcher may wish to use.

Please fill free to ask for assistance. While we have prepared various finding aids, manuscripts are difficult to index and we will be glad to assist you in meeting your research needs.

THE RESEARCHER MUST READ AND SIGN THIS RULE SHEET BEFORE ANY MATERIAL IS RETRIEVED.

Researchers must present to the attendant two pieces of identification---one with a photograph.

Coats, handbags, briefcases, typewriter cases, envelopes, etc. are to be placed in the cloak room or locker prior to entering the reference area. Only notepaper and essential personal reference books will be permitted at research tables.

Records of research room attendance, research topics and materials used will be maintained by the archival staff.

All material must be obtained from and returned to the stacks by the attendant, and may be used only in the reference area. The researcher must use great care in the handling of manuscripts, keeping them in order and being careful not to mark them. The researcher's hands must be clean. Leaning on documents will not be allowed.

Only one box of research material is allowed on the research table at any one time, and the researcher is responsible for the materials until returned. Another box will be given to the researcher by the attendant when it is requested, and the first returned.

The staff reserves the right to refuse the use of any material and may at any time prohibit the further use of a collection by a researcher.

All notes, photocopies, and personal reference books must be presented to the attendant for inspection before the researcher departs. The staff reserves the right to require a patron to submit to a search of his/her person conducted by a police officer, upon sufficient grounds.

Theft or mutilation of manuscript documents is a crime that will be prosecuted.

Food, drink, and smoking are not allowed in the reference area.

Documents must not be traded between patrons.

Refusal to follow any of the above stated rules and regulations may result in the denial of use of material.

DATE _____

NAME (PRINTED) _____

NAME (SIGNATURE) _____

APPENDIX 2

GUIDELINES FOR MARKING RARE BOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, AND OTHER SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

The guidelines which follow are intended to aid those libraries and other institutions which have decided that they will mark their materials. The primary intention is to provide as consistent and uniform practice as possible, given the wide variety and special nature of the materials concerned. They attempt to strike a balance between the implications of two major considerations: deterrence (visibility, permanence) and integrity of the document (both physical and aesthetic).

II. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Use permanent ink for marking.

B. Avoid secret marking as a primary identification device.

C. Place the ownership mark where it can be easily located (but not in a place that is too prominent or disfiguring).

D. Place the mark away from text or image on both sides of the leaf.

Marking is preferred to perforating or embossing. Visible marking is meant to reduce or obviate the need for secret marking, which lacks an immediate deterrence value. Placement of the ownership mark will vary according to each document. The place selected should be as close to the lower portion as possible, on the verso, at a site that is blank on both sides of the leaf, and removed sufficiently from the text or image on the side of the leaf on which it is placed to avoid disfigurement or confusion.

III. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Marks should be located as follows:

A. *Medieval and Renaissance Manuscripts.* On the verso of the first leaf of principal text, on the inner margin, approximate to the last line of text. Additional markings may be needed when the item is a composite manuscript or otherwise has a substantial text that may be broken away without noticeable injury to the volume. The location of each subsequent marking would be the

same. When the manuscript is too tightly bound to mark in the inner margin, alternate locations may be made in any blank area of the verso, as close to the lower portion of the text as possible. The mark should be so placed that it may not be excised without extreme cropping.

B. *Incunabula and Early Printed Books.* On the verso of the first leaf of principal text on the lower inner margin, approximate to the last line of text. Follow the same instructions as given under Medieval and Renaissance Manuscripts.

C. *Leaf Books, Single Leaves from Manuscripts.* On either verso or recto, at the lower portion of the text or image of each leaf. The choice may be determined by the document itself if one of the sides has more importance (illustration, annotation, etc.). The ownership mark should then be placed on the reverse side.

D. *Broadsides, Prints, Maps, Single Leaf letters and Documents.* On the verso, in the lower margin of the area occupied by text or image on the opposite side. Care should be taken to ensure that the specific area is blank on the side opposite to that which is to carry the mark. If the back side is entirely blank, the ownership mark may be placed freely in areas other than the lower margin.

E. *Multiple Leaf Manuscript Letters, Documents, Newspapers, Ephemera.* On the verso of the first leaf in the lower margin. It may be appropriate to place an additional mark later in the work if a portion (such as a famous signature, paper seal, first appearance of a poem, etc.) would have an independent value if detached or excised.

F. *Modern Printed Books, Pamphlets, Serial Issues.* On the verso of the first leaf of the opening text, directly below the first line. The placement is designed to spare the title page, half-title, dedication page, etc., which in many valuable productions have a separate aesthetic appeal not to be disfigured even on the verso. As in the case of multiple-leaf materials, additional markings may be indicated for those internal items (illustrations, maps, etc.) that may have separate marketable value.

IV. KIND OF INK AND EQUIPMENT

The ink should be permanent, inert in itself and in conservation treatment, and able to be applied in minute quantity. The ink and equipment (rubber stamp and balsa wood pad) may serve as an example.

V. FORM AND SIZE OF MARK

The size should be kept to a minimum (ca. 5-point type size for lettering). The form should be made up of initials identifying the institution as succinctly as possible, based on the National Union Catalog symbols, and suitable for arranging in lists to circulate to dealers, auction houses, collectors, etc.

VI. CANCELLATION OF MARK

Do not attempt to obliterate marks of ownership made according to these guidelines, even in the event that the material is to be deaccessioned. No system has yet been devised which cannot be imitated with relative ease by thieves, and there seems no alternative but to assume permanent responsibility for the fact of one's mark of ownership in a book, manuscript or other document. Permanent records should be kept of deaccessioned material containing marks of ownership made according to these guidelines, and the material itself when released should be accompanied by a signed letter of authorization on institutional stationery.

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